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This paper presents a model demonstrating how trust affects the volume of trade in a 
society. There are two ways in which this happens. First, at minimum, societies need a 
certain level of trust in order to observe trading activity. Second, once this minimum 
condition is satisfied, the probability of observing a larger volume of trade is high only if 
the level of trust is sufficiently high. Our results help explain empirical findings that 
demonstrate a positive relationship between trust and the volume of sales, or the value 
added of trade. The model also shows that institutions can compensate for low levels of 
trust—that is, societies with low levels of trust can achieve volumes of trade comparable to 
those of societies with high levels of trust by spending more resources on increasing the 
quality of the relevant institutions. 
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Este artículo presenta un modelo que muestra cómo los niveles de confianza afectan los 
volúmenes de comercio en una sociedad. Existen dos formas a través de las cuales dicho 
mecanismo funciona. Primero, las sociedades necesitan un mínimo de confianza para que 
se puedan observar transacciones comerciales. Segundo, una vez éste mínimo nivel se 
cumple, la probabilidad de observar mayor número de transacciones es alta si el nivel de 
confianza es suficientemente alto. Estos resultados ayudan a explicar algunos resultado 
empíricos que han mostrado una relación positiva entre confianza y volumen de ventas o 
valor agregado del comercio. El modelo también muestra que las instituciones pueden 
compensar bajos niveles de confianza. Es decir, las sociedades con bajos niveles de 
comercio pueden lograr volúmenes de comercio comparables a los que poseen las 
sociedades con altos niveles de confianza si asignan una mayor cantidad de recursos en 
mejorar la efectividad de las instituciones.    
  
 
Clasificación JEL: A13, D00, Z13 







♣ Agradezco a Mariana Laverde por su labor de reproducir las simulaciones de la sección 5.     
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1. Introduction 
 
Scholars in both the social sciences (Banfield, 1958; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; 
Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000; Gambetta, 2000; Granovetter, 2005) and economics (see 
below) have called attention to the negative effects of losses in social capital—especially 
losses in the level of trust—on social and economic outcomes. The main claim in the 
literature is that economic activities are carried out at a lower cost if societies have high 
levels of trust. Conversely, lower levels of trust imply a higher cost for these activities and, 
consequently, a smaller volume of transactions. This paper presents a model capturing the 
relationship between the level of trust and the volume of trade.  
 
The relationship between trust and certain economic outcomes has been also tested 
empirically using both micro and cross-country data. The evidence shows that societies 
with high levels of trust exhibit a higher value added of trade (Fafchamps and Minten, 
2001), more volume of sales (La Porta et al., 1997), deeper financial systems (Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales, 2004; Calderon et al., 2002), and high rates of investment and 
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). However, some of these findings 
have yet to be explained from a theoretical perspective.  
 
The relationship between trust and growth has already been explored by Zak and Knack 
(2001), as well as Somanathan and Rubin (2004). The former relate the level of trust 
explicitly to the level of investment and growth. Since brokers have more information about 
the return on investments than consumers, the latter will invest more heavily in assets when 
social and institutional environments foster a high level of trust. The latter are not as 
explicit as the former, but show how both honesty
1 and capital are co-determined within a 
growth framework. Using an endogenous growth model, they demonstrate that greater 
capital intensity increases the level of honesty, which increases the level of investment, and 
so forth.  
 
Our model does not focus on the relationship between trust and growth, but rather that 
between trust and the volume of trade, which also matters for growth. Thus, it is able to 
explain why sales, financial transactions and the value added of trade have a positive 
correlation with the level of trust. This kind of relationship has not yet been explained from 
a theoretical perspective. 
 
In the literature, there does not exist complete agreement as to a definition of (and measure 
for) trust. Almost all the references quoted above have used different definitions. 
Summarizing the views expressed by some of the authors of Trust: Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations, Gambetta (2000) gives the following definition: “trusting in a 
person means believing that when offered the chance, he or she is not likely to behave in a 
way is damaging to us”. We will utilize this type of belief as a measure of trust in this 
paper.  
                                                 
1 Although they concentrate on honesty, they argue that there must be a high correlation between this and 
trust.    4
 
Our model considers a society in which individuals are randomly matched into pairs, and 
have to decide whether or not to trade a given service or good. The transaction is carried 
out only if both individuals choose “trade” (that is, there exists an equilibrium with trade). 
Otherwise, the transaction is not carried out (that is, there exists an equilibrium without 
trade). Players only meet for one period, and there is no repeated interaction between them.  
 
Individuals do not know whether a person is trustworthy or not, but they do have beliefs 
regarding the percentage of trustworthy people in society as a whole. Thus, each individual 
believes that there exists probability θ  that he or she will be paired with a trustworthy 
partner, and probability  θ − 1  that he or she will be paired with an untrustworthy one. As 
noted, these beliefs (θ ) represent the measure of trust in society as a whole. 
Correspondingly, we can say that trust increases as θ  increases. Untrustworthy people 
always have incentives to cheat and they actually do. This behavior affects the payoff for 
the players. Additionally, the payoffs for cheating and being cheated are linked to the level 
of contract enforcement in society.   
 
The model predicts that in order to observe an equilibrium with trade, it is necessary that a 
minimum level of trust exists in society. This minimum level decreases as  contract 
enforcement become more effective (i.e., the quality of the relevant institutions is higher). 
Nevertheless, when this level of trust is met, an equilibrium without trade can also be 
observed. Thus, the necessity of there being a level of trust above the minimum level in 
order to observe an equilibrium with trade does not necessarily assure trading activity.  
 
In order to see under which circumstances we are more likely to observe an equilibrium 
with trade in a given society (once the minimum level of trust is met), Quantal Response 
Equilibria are computed. This kind of refinement allows us to make statistical rather than 
deterministic predictions regarding equilibrium strategies. Simulations show that if the 
level of trust is sufficiently high or contract enforcement is working appropriately—and 
individuals predict their payoffs relatively well—the probability of observing trading 
activity is one. However, the relationship between this probability and the level of trust is 
not always a positive one.   
 
In sum, our model is able to replicate the observation that trust matters vis-à-vis the volume 
of trade. Moreover, we show that if the level of trust is above the minimum level necessary 
to observe an equilibrium with trade in a given society, then this type of equilibrium is 
always socially desirable.  
 
Our model can be understood as being derived of one of Akerlof’s (1970) ideas: when there 
exists in a given society people selling services or goods in a dishonest manner--and there 
is incomplete information concerning those activities—then market qualities are affected. 
As expressed by Akerlof: “It is this possibility that represents the major cost of dishonesty 
– for dishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the market.”   
   5
The rest of the paper is organized into 6 sections. Section 2 describes the game, section 3 
discusses the first best solution, section 4 characterizes and describes the Bayes-Nash 
Equilibrium, and section 5 analyzes certain refinements. Welfare considerations are 




Consider a society with n individuals, indexed by  n i ,..., 1 = . There is one single period 
during which they are randomly matched into pairs in order to trade a specific service or 
good. Individuals in this society are of two types ( i t ): trustworthy ( t ti = ) and 
untrustworthy ( u ti = ). An individual’s type is private information. However, all 
individuals believe that proportion  () 1 , 0 ∈ θ  of people in their society are trustworthy. As 
we discussed in the introduction, θ  measures the level of trust in this society. Thus, trust 
increases as θ  increases.  
 
Untrustworthy individuals always cheat when they trade. In other words, they find it 
profitable to mimic the quality of the good/service, or the payment made for it. For 
instance, if the buyer is an untrustworthy individual, he or she will exaggerate to the seller 
the quality of the good/service. If the seller is an untrustworthy individual, he or she will 
not pay a part or even the total of the amount due (or might pay with a check without funds 
or using false money).   
 
After being randomly paired, each individual in each pair has to decide whether to “trade” (
T ) or “not-trade” (N ) the good/service with his or her partner. The trade is carried out 
only if both players choose T . We call this outcome an equilibrium with trade. Otherwise, 
there is no trade for the match. We call this outcome an equilibrium without trade. The 
payoffs in the game are normalized to lie in the interval [] 1 , 1 − , and correspond to the 
surplus in monetary units obtained by each individual. 
 
If two trustworthy individuals are paired, nobody cheats. Therefore, if they both choose T , 
each will receives his or her full valuation of the good/service. In this case, we set the 
payoff for each individual as zero. If a trustworthy player is paired with an untrustworthy 
player, the latter will cheat. If under this scenario both players choose T , the trustworthy 
player receives a payoff of  [ ) 0 , 1 − ∈ a , while the untrustworthy one receives a payoff of  a −
. In words, the untrustworthy player is able to capture part of the surplus of the trustworthy 
player. 
 
If two untrustworthy individuals are paired, both will cheat. If under this scenario both 
players choose T , each receives a payoff of  a α , with  [] 1 , 0 ∈ α . This payoff entails two 
issues. First, as we explain below, a is directly linked to the degree of contract 
enforcement that exists in society. Writing down this payoff in terms of a then allows us to 
associate all the relevant payoffs in the game with the degree of contract enforcement.   6
Second, the assumption with respect to α  implies that the loss that an untrustworthy player 
experiences—when paired with an individual of the same type and where both choose T —
is smaller or equal to the loss that a trustworthy player experiences when paired with an 
untrustworthy type and where both choose T . Since a trustworthy player cheats and an 
untrustworthy one does not, it makes sense to assume that the behavior of the latter allows 
him or her to experience a loss relatively smaller than that experienced by the former when 
both are cheated. 
 
Finally, if one or both individuals in the pair chooses N , then the good/service is not 
traded. When this happens, each individual has to face a transaction cost equal to  0 < µ , 
regardless of his or her type. The respective payoffs are summarized in tables 1, 2 and 3. 
   
Table 1    









Table 2    









Table 3     










Assumption 1:  µ < a .  
Assumption 1 states that the loss experienced by a trustworthy player when she or he 
engages in trading with an untrustworthy player, is greater than the loss he or she 
t            t T  N 
T  0 , 0   µ µ,  
N  µ µ,   µ µ,  
t         u T  N 
T  a a − ,   µ µ,  
N  µ µ,   µ µ,  
u          u T  N 
T  a a α α ,   µ µ,  
N  µ µ,   µ µ,    7
experiences when choosing  N in the same pairing. Notice that if a were larger than µ , 
then the individuals involved would always have an incentive to choose T . By the way, 
this assumption implies that when the type of each player is known, a trustworthy type 
would never willingly trade with an untrustworthy type.  
 
Notice that  a α  can be either smaller or greater than µ . No assumption is made in this 
regard. The scenario represented by  a µ α ≥  is designated an “untrustworthy high-costs 
case.” Correspondingly, the scenario represented by  a µ α <  is designated a “non-
trustworthy low-costs case.”  The extensive form of the game is displayed in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  
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As anticipated above, the degree of contract enforcement in this society is measured by a. 
If contract enforcement works perfectly, a player who has been cheated can force his or her 
partner to honor the contract, and thus acquire the contracted payoff. In this case, a tends 
to be zero. However, if contract enforcement does not work adequately, a tends to be high 
in absolute terms (i.e., it goes to -1). Thus, improvements in contract enforcement are 
related with smaller values (in absolute terms) of a.  
 
3. First-Best Surplus 
 
In order to identify the efficient level of surplus, in this section we consider the case in 
which there is perfect information. Under these circumstances, each individual in a pair is 
able to observe whether his or her partner is trustworthy or untrustworthy. However, in 
order to isolate only the effect of the information on the equilibrium outcome, we still 
maintain that individuals are randomly paired.  
 
The Nash equilibrium (NE) assuming perfect information depends on the profile of each 
pair. The equilibria can be summarized as follows: 
  
Profile 1: If two trustworthy individuals are paired, then  () ( ) {} N N T T NE , , , = .  
Profile 2: If a trustworthy individual is paired with an untrustworthy one, then 
() ( ) {} N N T N NE , , , = . 
Profile 3a: If two untrustworthy individuals are paired, and  a µ α ≥ , then 
() () ( ) {} N N N T T N NE , , , , , = . 
Profile 3b: If two untrustworthy individuals are paired, and  a µ α < , then 
() ( ) {} N N T T NE , , , = . 
  
First, let us consider the untrustworthy high-costs case (i.e.,  a µ α ≥ ). Since  0 < µ , the 
efficient equilibrium under profile 1 is  () {} T T, . Thus, if two trustworthy individuals are 
paired, then the observed outcome is an equilibrium with trade. The surplus generated for 
each pair under this profile is zero. Under profile 2, the achieved outcome is always an 
equilibrium without trade. The surplus generated for each pair under this profile is  µ 2 . The 
same thing happens under profile 3a. In this case then, the social expected surplus is given 
by:  
  ( ) µ θ n Sh




h S  increases as θ  increases. In other words, when  a µ α ≥ , the efficient 
surplus increases as the level  of trust increases.  
 
Let us now consider the untrustworthy low-costs case ( a µ α < ). The only difference vis-
à-vis the previous case occurs when two untrustworthy individuals are paired (profile 3b),   9
which occurs with a probability of ()
2 1 θ − . In this case, since a µ α < , the efficient 
equilibrium is  () {} T T, . The surplus generated for each pair under this profile is  a α 2 . In this 
case then, the social expected surplus is given by:  
 
  () () [] θµ α θ θ 2 1 1
* + − − = a n Sl      (2) 
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. If this inequality holds in 
the opposite direction, then 
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We concentrate on Bayes-Nash Equilibria (BNE) in pure strategies. TN  denotes the 
strategy whereby player i plays T  if  t ti = , and  N  if  u ti = . TT , NT  and  NN  are defined 
accordingly. The payoffs for the strategic representation of the game between players i and 
j  are displayed in table 4. 
 
Table 4.    
Game in strategic form. 
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  µ µ,  
NN  µ µ,   µ µ,   µ µ,   µ µ,  
 
 
The BNE depend on both the level of trust and the value of α . There are two relevant 
thresholds with respect to the level of trust:  () ( ) () α α µ θ + − − = 1
~
1 a a , and  () a a µ θ − = 2
~
. 
It is easy to see that when  a µ α ≥ , then  [ ) 1 , 0
~
1∈ θ . However, if  a µ α < , then  0
~
1 < θ . In 
this case, it becomes an irrelevant threshold. On the other hand,  2
~
θ  always falls in the 
interval () 1 , 0 . Note also that  1
~
θ is always smaller than  2
~
θ .  
   10
The equilibria are computed for all possible cases. These cases can be summarized as 
follows:  (1)  a µ α ≥ , and  ( ) 1
~




θ θ θ ∈ ; (3)  a µ α ≥ , and 
[ ) 1 ,
~
2 θ θ ∈ ; (4)  a µ α < , and  ( ) 2
~
, 0 θ θ ∈ ; and (5)  a µ α < , and  [ ) 1 ,
~
2 θ θ ∈ . Table 5 shows 
the BNE of the game. For each of the five cases mentioned above, multiple equilibria exist; 
some of them predict an equilibrium with trade, and some predict an equilibrium without 
trade.  
 
Table 5.    
Bayes-Nash Equilibria in pure strategies 
 
  () 1
~




θ θ θ ∈   [ ) 1 ,
~
2 θ θ ∈  
a
µ
α ≥  
() TT NN, , () NN TT, , 
() NT NN, , () NN NT, , 
() NN NN,  
() NT NN, , () NN NT, , 
() NN NN,  
() TT TT, , 
() NT NN, , () NN NT, , 
() NN NN,  
a
µ
α <   () NT NT, , 
() NN NN,  
() TT TT, , 
() NT NT, , 
() NN NN,  
 
Consider the untrustworthy high-costs case ( a µ α ≥ ). Based on the BNE, the following 
results are obtained: 
a)  Society requires a minimum level of trust in order to observe an equilibrium with trade. 
This minimum level of trust is  2
~
θ . 
b)  If  2
~
θ θ ≥ , equilibrium with trade is not the only possible outcome. Equilibrium without 
trade could also be observed.  
c)  The minimum level of trust required to observe trade in a given society ( 2
~
θ ) decreases 
as contract enforcement (a) improves. Moreover, the closer to perfect it is, the more the 
minimum level approaches zero. 
 
Results (a) and (b) imply that when   ( ) 2
~
, 0 θ θ ∈ , the outcome will be an equilibrium without 
trade. An equilibrium with trade can only be observed when  [ ) 1 ,
~
2 θ θ ∈ . However, even 
where  2
~
θ θ ≥ , some equilibria predict an outcome without trade. Actually, only one of the 
four possible equilibria predicts an outcome with trade ( TT TT, ). Result (c) follows from 
the fact that  0
~







2 This last result implies that if contract 
                                                 
2 Only for this case, this result requires that  1 = α . Perfect contract enforcement has some restrictions in this 
model. From assumption 1, we have  0 < < µ a . Moreover, in the case under consideration,  a µ α ≥ . Thus, 
for this case, it only makes sense to take into account values of asmaller or equal to αµ . Actually, if contract 
enforcement were perfect (or more generally, if a were larger than  µ ), then individuals would always have 
an incentive for choosing T  .    11
enforcement works well enough, an equilibrium with trade may yet be observed, regardless 
of the level of trust.  
 
Now, consider the untrustworthy low-costs case ( a µ α < ). From the BNE, the following 
results are obtained: 
a)  An equilibrium with trade can be observed under any level of trust. However, since 
there are multiple equilibria, most of them predicting no-trade, this cannot be the only 
observed outcome. 
b)  If  ( ) 2
~
, 0 θ θ ∈ , and there exists an equilibrium with trade in a given society, then the case 
can only involve untrustworthy individuals. More specifically, under this scenario, 
trustworthy types will always choose  N . 
c)  The minimum level of trust required to observe trading in a given society that involves 




Unlike with the untrustworthy high cost case, in this case, there is no required minimum 
level of trust in order that we observe trading activity in the given society. However, if trust 
is low enough, only untrustworthy individuals will be willing to trade. Under such a 
scenario, trustworthy types are outside of the market (as in Akerlof, 1970). Trustworthy 
players are only willing to trade if the level of trust is sufficiently high (i.e., larger or equal 
to  2
~
θ ). As we already know, this threshold decreases as contract enforcement improves.      
 
So far, these results show that the level of trust affects the volume of trade in a given 
society. However, even when the level of trust is high enough, it is possible to observe an 
equilibrium without trade. These results raise the following questions. Assuming that the 
level of trust is high enough to observe trading activity, under what conditions are we more 
likely to observe an equilibrium with trade? In particular, how do trust and contract 
enforcement affect the probability of observing trade in a given society? These issues are 
considered in the next section. 
  
5. Refinement of Equilibria  
 
From section 4, we already know that when  a µ α ≥ , the only equilibrium that predicts 
trading activity is ( TT TT, ). On the other hand, when  a µ α < , there are two equilibria 
wherein trade is observed: ( TT TT, ), ( NT NT, ). However, under this last equilibrium, only 
untrustworthy individuals are willing to trade. What we are interested in knowing is under 
which circumstances are we more likely to observe an equilibrium wherein trade exists for 
every pair (i.e., ( TT TT, )). Note that this equilibrium is only observed when  2
~
θ θ ≥ . 
 
In order to see this, we use Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE). As with other types of 
refinements, the idea behind QRE is that players make infinitesimal errors in choosing best 
strategies. With this type of refinement, best response functions become probabilistic. This 
allows us to make statistical rather than deterministic predictions regarding equilibrium   12
strategies. In other words, by using QRE, it is possible to compute the probability that an 
individual will play a certain strategy. Actually, these probabilities represent the QRE. A 
detailed description of the QRE can be found in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998).  
 
Since analytical solutions of the QRE are not easily tractable, we use some simulations in 
order to see how the probability of observing the strategy profile ( TT TT, ) at equilibrium 
(hereafter,  TT i, π ) is affected as either trust or contract enforcement change. We assume a 
logistic distribution in the error term of the payoffs, and use the following set of parameters 
in the simulations:  5 . − = a ,  35 . 0 . − = µ , and  1 = α . Notice that under these parameters, 
3 .
~
2 = θ . This level of trust is a little bit below the average measure of trust computed from 
the World Values Surveys 1990-1993, which is 0.35.
3 Notice also that these parameters 
restrict our case to one where  a µ α ≥ . The results of the simulation do not change in any 
important way for the case where  a µ α < . Additionally, these results are not affected in 
any important way when we use a different set of parameters. Gambit-Version 
0.2007.01.30 was used to obtain the QRE (McKelvey, McLennan, and Turocy, 2007).
4  
 
Figures 2 and 3 depict how  TT i, π  changes as the parameter λ  in the logistic function 
changes, for different values of trust and contract enforcement. Parameter λ  is inversely 
related to the error that players accumulate in predicting their payoffs. Therefore,  0 = λ  
means that players’ actions consist of all error (In this case  i ij J 1 = π , where  i J  is the 
number of pure strategies of player i), and  ∞ = λ  means that there is no error. 
Consequently, high values for λ  are related to the experience or the learning of players in 
the game (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995).
5  
 
Figure 2 shows how  TT i, π  changes as θ  goes from  2
~
θ  to 1. The following results are 
obtained: 
a)  If  θ  is high enough (and only if θ   is high enough), then  1 , → TT i π  as  ∞ → λ . 
Otherwise,  0 , → TT i π  as  ∞ → λ . 
b)  If θ  is high enough, then  TT i, π  always increases as λ  increases. 
c)  If we hold λ  constant,  TT i, π  does not always increases with θ . 
 
                                                 
3 This measure represents the fraction of people in each of 40 countries that answered in favor of the first 
choice to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t 
be too careful when dealing with people?” 
4 The normal form of the game reported in Table 4 was used for the simulations. It is important to take into 
account that McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) showed that the QRE for extensive form games makes predictions 
that contradict the invariant principle. 
5 Our game is played for only one single period. Individuals can learn by playing the same game several 
times. In this case, it is necessarily to assume that the probability of being paired with the same partner over 
more than one period is zero. This avoids building-reputation issues.     13
In the simulation, if the level of trust is smaller or equal to 0.456, then  TT i, π  goes to zero as 
λ  approaches infinity. Nevertheless, this probability goes to one as λ  approaches infinity 
if the level of trust is higher or equal to 0.457. Statement (a) follows from this result. In 
other words, it states that if the level of trust is high enough, and players accumulate 
experience playing the game, strategy TT  will be chosen with a probability of 1. Under 
such a scenario, one will observe an equilibrium with trade for every pair. Result (b) states 
that if the level of trust is high enough (i.e., above 0.456 in the simulation), then the 
probability that player i will choose TT  will always increase as his or her experience 
playing the game increases. 
 
Figure 2.     
Quantal Response Equilibrium: changes in  TT i, π  as θ  changes. 
 
 
                                                                  Lambda 
 
Result (c) indicates that for the same level of experience (λ ),  TT i, π  does not necessarily 
increase as the level of trust increases. For instance, consider the case in the simulations 
wherein  29 = λ . If θ  goes from 0.5 to 0.7, then  TT i, π  increases. However, if θ  goes from 
0.7 to 0.9,  TT i, π  decreases. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that the probability of 
observing an equilibrium with trade in a given society increases as the level of trust 
increases. This only happens for intermediate values of θ .           
 
Now, let us consider the effects of contract enforcement on  TT i, π , which are illustrated in 
Figure 3. In this simulation,  3 . 0 = θ . The following results are obtained: 
a)  If a is low enough, then  1 , → TT i π  as  ∞ → λ ; otherwise,  0 , → TT i π  as  ∞ → λ . 
















0 1 3 9 29 91 286 899 2823  14
These results are similar to those reported for the effect of θ  on  TT i, π . When  4253 . 0 − ≤ a  
in the simulation (i.e., law enforcement works relatively badly), then  TT i, π  approaches zero 
as  λ  approaches infinity. For any  4253 . 0 − > a , the probability approaches one.
6 In other 
words, if law enforcement works relatively well, and players accumulate experience in the 
game, then they will choose strategy TT  with a probability of 1. Under such a scenario, 
one observes an equilibrium with trade for every pair.  
 
Result (b) indicates that if contract enforcement works relatively well, then the probability 
with which player i chooses TT  always increases as his or her experience playing the game 
increases. Unlike with the simulation reported in figure 2, here  TT i, π  always increases as a 
decreases for any given value of λ . However, this result cannot be generalized. If we hold 
λ  constant, it happens in some simulations that  TT i, π  decreases as a decreases for low 
values of a. 
 
Figure 3.   
Quantal Response Equilibrium: changes in  TT i, π  as a changes. 
 
                                                                                      Lambda 
 
6. Welfare considerations 
 
As we have seen in section 5, the combination of individual experience (λ  high) with a 
high level of trust can lead to a scenario whereby there is an equilibrium with trade for 
every pair (i.e.,  1 , = TT i π   i ∀ ) in a given society. On the other hand, low levels of trust 
(though still larger than  2
~
θ ) can lead to the opposite scenario, i.e. one without trade for 
                                                 
6 The simulations where  4252 . 0 − = a  are not shown in figure 3 for presentation reasons. In this case,  TT i, π  only 
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every pair. In this section, we analyze whether high levels of trust, which lead to an 
equilibrium with trade for every pair, are socially desirable or not.  
 
First, let us compute the total social surplus when there is an equilibrium with trade for 
every pair. If two trustworthy individuals are paired, the total generated surplus for this 
match is zero. If a trustworthy individual is paired with an untrustworthy individual, the 
total generated surplus for this pair is also zero. Finally, if two untrustworthy individuals 
are paired, the total generated surplus is  a α 2 . Thus, the social expected surplus if 
everybody chooses T  is given by: 
 
  () na ST
2 1 θ α − =      (3) 
 
Notice that  T S  increases as the level of trust increases.  
 
Second, let us consider the expected surplus achieved when everybody chooses a strategy 
whereby there is an equilibrium without trade for every pair. If this happens, the social 
expected surplus is given by: 
 
  µ n SN =           (4) 
 
First comparing T S  and  N S , we obtain the following results: 
a)  For an untrustworthy high cost case ( a µ α ≥ ): if  a µ α = , then  N T S S >  for every
( ] 1 , 0 ∈ θ . If  a µ α > , then there always exists a unique  () 1 , 0 ∈ θ  for which, if  θ θ > , 
then   N T S S > . Moreover,  2
~
θ θ < . 
b)  For an untrustworthy low cost case ( a µ α < ): in this case  N T S S >  for every  [] 1 , 0 ∈ θ
. 
 
Results (a) and (b) can be understood in the following way. They indicate that if the level of 
trust is above  2
~
θ , then the surplus generated in a given society whereby everybody is 
trading is always larger than the respective surplus when nobody is trading. Thus, a high 
enough level of trust combined with relatively high players’ experience is always preferred 
over a low level of trust. 
 
Let us now compare the efficient expected surplus with  T S  and  N S  respectively. First, we 
consider the untrustworthy high cost case ( a µ α ≥ ). Under these circumstances, the 
efficient expected surplus is represented by 
*




h N S S < , for every  ( ] 1 , 0 ∈ θ . 
b)  If a µ α = , then 
*
h T S S >  for every  () 1 , 0 ∈ θ .   16
c)  If  a µ α > , then there always exists a unique  () 1 , 0 ∈ θ
(
 for which, if  θ θ
(
> , then 
T
*






On the one hand, result (a) indicates that an equilibrium where nobody trades is always 
inefficient, regardless of the level of trust. Thus, a relatively low level of trust (though still 
larger than  2
~
θ ), can lead a given society to achieve an equilibrium without trade, which is 
undesirable. On the other hand, results (b) and (c) indicate that if the level of trust is above 
2
~
θ , an equilibrium with trade for every pair is always socially desirable. This is so, because 
*
h T S S >  for any  2
~
θ θ > . 
 
Finally, let us consider the untrustworthy low cost case ( a µ α < ). Under these 
circumstances, the efficient is represented by 
*




l N S S <  for every  [] 1 , 0 ∈ θ . 
b) 
*
l T S S >  for every  ( ] 1 , 0 ∈ θ .  
 
Result (a) indicates that an equilibrium where nobody trades is always inefficient, 
regardless of the level of trust. Result (b) indicates that an equilibrium with trade is always 
socially desirable.  
 
From our discussion in this section, we conclude that an equilibrium with trade for every 
pair (i.e., where  1 = TT π i ∀ ) is always socially desired if the level of trust is above the 
threshold  2
~
θ . Since this is a necessary condition in order to observe a scenario where 




This paper shows that the level of trust affects the volume of trade. There are two ways in 
which this happens. First, societies need a minimum level of trust in order to observe 
trading activity. If this minimum level is not satisfied, then an equilibrium without trade is 
always observed. Second, once the level of trust is above this minimum level, the 
probability of observing an equilibrium with trade approaches one, if both the level of trust 
and players’ experience are high enough. Otherwise, the probability tends towards zero. 
These results explain the empirical findings showing a positive relationship between the 
level of trust and the volume of sales and the value added of trade. 
 
The paper also shows that institutions can compensate for low levels of trust. There are two 
channels through which this operates. First, when contract enforcement works perfectly, the 
minimum level of trust required to observe trading activity in a given society approaches 
zero. Second, given a certain level of trust, the probability of observing an equilibrium with   17
trade approaches one when contract enforcement works relatively well. These results imply 
that, in order to achieve similar volumes of trade, societies with low levels of trust must 
spend a higher amount of resources on increasing the quality of institutions than societies 
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Consider the strategic representation of the game presented in table 4. Best response 
arguments are used in order to find the BNE in pure strategies. The following thresholds for 
the level of trust are used:  () ( ) () α α µ θ + − − = 1
~




Untrustworthy high-costs case ( a µ α ≥ ). Consider a pair consisting of players i and  j . 
First, let us assume that player  j  adopts strategy TT . Player i will then prefer strategy TT  
to TN  if and only if   1
~
θ θ ≥ , TT  to NT  if and only if  2
~
θ θ ≥ , TN  to NN  if and only if 
2
~
θ θ ≥ , and NT  to NN  if and only if  1
~
θ θ ≥ . From here, we conclude that if  j  adopts 
strategy TT , then player i’s best response will be NN  if  ( ) 1
~




θ θ θ ∈ ; 
and  TT  if   [ ) 1 ,
~
2 θ θ ∈ .  
 
Second, let us assume that player  j  adopts strategy TN . Under such a scenario, player i’s 
best response is TT . This result follows from the following comparisons. First, player i 
prefers strategy TT  to TN  if and only if  µ ≥ − a , which is always satisfied. Second, player 
i prefers strategy TT  to NT  if and only if  0
2 ≥ − µ θ , which also is always satisfied. 
Finally, player i prefers strategy TT  to NN  if and only if  () µ θ ≥ − − a 1 , which again, is 
always satisfied.   
 
Third, let us assume that player  j  adopts strategy  NT . In this case, player i’s best response 
isNN . We obtain this result using the following reasoning. First, player i prefers strategy 
NN to  TT  if and only if  () ( ) () α µ α θ − − − ≥ 1 a a . Since  () 0 1 > − − α a , and from   
assumption 1 it follows that  0 ≤ − µ αa , then () ( ) () 0 1 ≤ − − − α µ α a a . Thus, this 
inequality always holds because  () 1 , 0 ∈ θ . Second, player i prefers strategy  NN  to TN  if 
and only if   a ≤ µ , which is always satisfied. Finally, player i prefers strategy  NN  to NT  
if and only if  µ α ≤ a , which is the actual case we are analyzing. 
 
Finally, if player  j  adopts strategy  NN , then any player i‘s strategy is a best response.  
From this analysis, we conclude that:  
1)  If  ( ) 1
~
, 0 θ θ ∈ , then  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) {} NN NN NN NT NN TT NT NN TT NN BNE , , , , , , , , , = ; 




θ θ θ ∈ , then  () () () {} NN NN NN NT NT NN BNE , , , , , = ; and 
3)  If  [ ) 1 ,
~
2 θ θ ∈ , then  ( ) () () () {} NN NN NN NT NT NN TT TT BNE , , , , , , , = . 
 
Untrustworthy low-costs case ( a µ α < ). Consider a pair consisting of players i and  j .  
First, let us assume that player  j  adopts strategy TT . Player i will then prefer strategy TT    19
to  TN , and NT to  NN . This happens because  µ α > a . Additionally, player i prefers 
strategy TT  to NT  if and only if  2
~
θ θ ≥ ; and TN  to NN  if and only if  2
~
θ θ ≥ . From here, 
we can conclude that if  j  adopts strategy TT , then i’s best response is  NT  if  ( ) 2
~
, 0 θ θ ∈ , 
and TT  if  [ ) 1 ,
~
2 θ θ ∈ .  
 
Second, let us assume that player  j  adopts strategy TN . The same arguments presented for 
the scenario wherein  a µ α ≥  can be use to show that, in this case, player i’s best 
response is TT.  
 
Third, let us assume that player  j  adopts strategy  NT . In this case, player i’s best response 
is  NT . We obtain this result using the following reasoning: first, since  µ > a , player i 
prefers strategy  NT  to TT . Second, player i prefers strategy  NT  to NN  if and only if 
µ α > a , which is always satisfied. Finally, player i prefers strategy  NN  to TN  if and only 
if  µ < a , which is also always satisfied. By transitivity, it follows that player i always 
prefers strategy  NT  to TN . 
 
Finally, if player  j  adopts strategy  NN , then any player i‘s strategy is a best response. 
From this analysis, one can conclude that: 
1)  If  ( ) 2
~
, 0 θ θ ∈ , then  () () {} NN NN NT NT BNE , , , = ; and 
2)  If  [ ) 1 ,
~




Comparing  T S  and  N S . Consider the expressions for  T S  and  N S   given in equations 3 










. On the 
other,  N S  equals  µ n  for every θ . Therefore, if  a µ α = , then  N T S S >  for every 
( ] 1 , 0 ∈ θ ; and if  a µ α < , then  N T S S >  for every  [] 1 , 0 ∈ θ .  
 
Only when  a µ α >  is  N T S S <  for small values of θ . More exactly, this happens when 
θ α µ θ = − < a 1 , with  () 1 , 0 ∈ θ . Thus,  N T S S >  for every  θ θ > . Notice that  θ θ > 2
~
 if 




h S  and  N S . Using equations 1 and 4, we get  N h S S >
*  if and only if 
( ) 1 1
2 < −θ . This inequality is always satisfied for every  ( ] 1 , 0 ∈ θ . 
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Comparing 
*
h S  and  T S . Consider equations 1 and 3. Notice that  0 > ∂ ∂ θ T S , 
0
















T S . On the other hand, 
0
* > ∂ ∂ θ h S ,  0




















h S .  
 
Remember that in this case,  a µ α > . Thus, if  a µ α = , based on the previous properties 
of   T S  and 
*
h S , we find that 
*
h T S S >  for every  () 1 , 0 ∈ θ . In actual fact, these functions only 
take the same value at their limits. If  a µ α > , there is a unique root,  () 1 , 0 ∈ θ
(
, at which 














 if and 




l S  and  N S . Using equations 2 and 4,  N l S S >
*  if and only if 
() () () µ θ θ α θ − − > − 1 2 1 1
2 a . Since () () 0 1 2 1 1
2 > − − > − θ θ θ , and  µ α > > a 0 , this 




l S  and  T S . Using equations 2 and 3,  T l S S <
*  if and only if  0 2 < θµ . This 
inequality is satisfied for every  ( ] 1 , 0 ∈ θ .  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 